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Low participation rates limit the effectiveness of
401(k) plans as a reliable source of retirement income.
About one in five workers eligible to participate in
their employer’s 401(k) plans do not enroll (Munnell,
Golub-Sass, and Muldoon 2009). Firms can raise par-
ticipation rates by automatically enrolling employees
as soon as they become eligible. However, higher par-
ticipation rates increase costs for employers that match
employee contributions, and firms appear to reduce
the rate at which they contribute to 401(k) plans when
they adopt autoenrollment. Autoenrollment, then, will
not necessarily raise future incomes for all eligible
employees.
Autoenrollment
Automatic enrollment is an increasingly popular 401(k)
feature that enrolls employees as soon as they become
eligible. Between 1999 and 2008, the percentage of 401(k)
plans with automatic enrollment increased from 4.2 to
39.6 (PSCA 2008). Madrian and Shea (2001) found that
automatic enrollment increased participation rates of
new hires from 49 to 86 percent, leading academics,
policymakers, and employers to embrace automatic
enrollment as a solution to low plan participation and
a way to increase retirement savings (U.S. GAO 2009).
The 2006 Pension Protection Act (especially the release
of related Internal Revenue Service rules in March
2009) will likely further boost the share of employers
offering automatic enrollment.
Effects of Autoenrollment on an 
Employer Match
Most companies with automatic enrollment match their
employees’ contributions (Beshears et al. 2009), usually
by contributing 50 cents for every dollar contributed by
employees, up to 6 percent of salary. Unless employers
cut costs in some way, the increase in pension participa-
tion generated by automatic enrollment will increase
employers’ cost of offering a match. In fact, companies
often report that the cost of matching is the most impor-
tant barrier to adding automatic enrollment (Bruno 2008).
We find evidence that firms reduce their match rate
to offset the costs of automatic enrollment. Our statistical
model shows that match rates are 7 percentage points
lower among firms with automatic enrollment than
among those without it, after we control for industry, plan
size, and whether the firm also offers a defined benefit
plan (figure 1). For firms with 60 percent or more partic-
ipation before automatic enrollment, we estimate that a
7 percentage point reduction in match rates would offset
at least 42 percent of the cost increase associated with
autoenrollment.
Of course, these results might indicate that firms
with low match rates are more likely to adopt automatic
enrollment because their matching expenses are already
low, not that firms cut their match rates in response to
autoenrollment. Either way, the results imply that auto-
enrollment may not promote retirement savings as
effectively as some have claimed. We need additional
research on how employers set their match level to bet-
ter understand how they might respond to automatic
enrollment.
Effects of Automatic Enrollment on
Retirement Security
Most of the discussion surrounding automatic enroll-
ment has focused on how it benefits employees by
increasing pension coverage and retirement savings.
However, it is not free for employers. While autoenroll-
ment is likely to boost the retirement savings of workers
who would not participate without it, our findings sug-
gest it could lead to lower account balances at retire-
ment for those who were already enrolled or would
have enrolled anyway. The prospect of lower match
rates may not only reduce employer contributions, but
might also lower workers’ contributions (Engelhardt
and Kumar 2004; Even and Macpherson 2005).
Looking forward, a broader question is whether
employers will continue offering matches after adopt-
ing automatic enrollment. In the past, the match was
intended to increase employee participation and con-
tributions (Choi et al. 2002). But research has shown
that a match has only a modest impact on plan partici-
pation beyond that of automatic enrollment (Beshears
et al. 2009). It will be important to monitor the effects
of automatic enrollment on retirement contributions to
assess the long-term effects of increasing enrollment.
T H E  R E T I R E M E N T  P O L I C Y P R O G R A M
Urban Institute • 2100 M Street, NW • Washington, DC 20037 • Phone: 202-833-7200 • http://www.urban.org
 
2w w w . r e t i r e m e n t p o l i c y . o r g
Acknowledgment
This brief, funded through a generous grant from the
Rockefeller Foundation, is based on Soto and Butrica
(2009). The authors thank Richard Johnson and Sheila
Zedlewski for their comments.
References
Beshears, John, James Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte Madrian. 2009.
“The Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation
under Automatic Enrollment.” In Research Findings in the Economics
of Aging, edited by David A. Wise. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Bruno, Mark. 2008. “Cost of 401(k) Match Limits Use of Auto-
Enrollment.” Investment News. March 17.
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew
Metrick. 2002. “Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules,
Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance.” In Tax
Policy and the Economy, vol. 16, edited by James Poterba (67–114).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Engelhardt, Gary V., and Anil Kumar. 2004. “Employer Matching and
401(k) Saving: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study.”
Center for Retirement Research Working Paper 2004-18. Chestnut
Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College.
Even, William E., and David A. Macpherson. 2005. “The Effects of
Employer Matching in 401(k) Plans.” Industrial Relations 44(3):
525–49.
Madrian, Brigitte C., and Dennis F. Shea. 2001. “The Power of
Suggestion: Inertia in 401(K) Participation and Savings Behavior.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4): 1149–87.
Munnell, Alicia H., Francesca Golub-Sass, and Dan Muldoon. 2009.
“An Update on 401(k) Plans: Insights from the 2007 SCF.” Issue in
Brief 9-5. Chestnut Hill, MA: Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College.
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (PSCA). 2008. 52nd
Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans. Chicago, IL:
PSCA.
Soto, Mauricio, and Barbara A. Butrica. 2009. “Will Automatic
Enrollment Reduce Employer Contributions to 401(k) Plans?”
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2009. “Automatic
Enrollment Shows Promise for Some Workers, but Proposals to
Broaden Retirement Savings for Other Workers Could Face
Challenges.” GAO-10-31. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Accountability Office.
About the Authors
Barbara A. Butrica is a senior research associate in the
Income and Benefits Policy Center at the Urban Institute.
Mauricio Soto is an economist in the Fiscal Affairs
Department of the International Monetary Fund.




























Copyright © December 2009. The Urban Institute
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Urban Institute, its board, its sponsors, or other authors in the series.
Permission is granted for reproduction of this document, with attribution to the Urban Institute.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Annual Return/Report Form 5500 Series for Plan Year 2007 and the Pensions & Investments database of the top 1,000 pension
funds (P&I 1,000) as of September 30, 2008.
Notes: The Form 5500 contains information on the full universe of private sector employer-provided pension plans, including employer and employee contribu-
tions, number of participants, pension type, and employer industry. The P&I 1,000 contains information on the largest 1,000 private and public pension funds in
the United States, including whether 401(k) plan sponsors offer automatic enrollment. The regression sample is constructed by merging data from the Form 5500
and the P&I. The final sample includes 532 firms with 100 or more plan participants (active and retired). 
